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Abstract The bulk of evidence on the lack of international risk sharing is based
on regressions of idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic output
growth. This paper argues that the results from such regressions obtained from
international data are, however, not directly comparable to those based on re-
gional data: the standard practice of running such regressions on international
data fails to account for persistent international differentials in consumer
prices, whereas—implicitly—most of the literature based on regional data
has accounted for these differences. When risk sharing regressions are set
up in conceptually the same way in international and regional data sets, the
estimated coefficients are also very similar. To explore this result further, we
adapt the variance decomposition of Asdrubali et al. (Q J Econ 111:1081–1110,
1996) to allow for deviations from purchasing power parity across countries.
While quantity (income and credit) flows are the dominant channel of risk
sharing among regions, relative consumption and output price (internal terms
of trade) fluctuations account for the bulk of the deviation from the complete
markets outcome in international data. To the extent that persistent differ-
ences in consumer prices are an indication of goods market segmentation, our
findings provide empirical evidence for the proposition by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 2000) that segmented international
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goods markets rather than asset market incompleteness may account for the
(apparent) lack of risk sharing between countries.
Keywords International consumption risk sharing · Capital flows ·
Trading cost · New open economy macroeconomics · Home bias
JEL Classification F21 · F32 · F36 · E21
1 Introduction
Risk sharing between regions and nations has been the focus of much empirical
research over the last decade.1 The main conclusion that emerges from this
literature is that regions within a country share a lot more consumption risk
than do countries.
Most of the evidence on international and interregional risk sharing is based
on panel regressions of real idiosyncratic consumption growth on other idio-
syncratic variables, mostly national or regional output. The motivation behind
such risk sharing regressions is that in a world with complete capital markets,
countries and regions will insure completely against any idiosyncratic risk.
If furthermore, trade in goods markets is frictionless so that prices equalize
across countries and regions, then, ex post , there should not be any correlation
between a country’s or region’s relative output and consumption. The size of
the regression coefficient of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic output
can therefore be interpreted as a measure of the deviation from the complete
markets outcome.
This paper argues that the results obtained from such regressions in inter-
national data are not generally comparable to those based on regional data.
The reason for this is that for most countries consumer price indexes are
not available at the regional level. Therefore, in regional data, the commonly
applied procedure is to transform nominal into real quantities by deflating with
the country-wide CPI. This practice preserves fluctuations in the relative value
of consumption across regions. In this paper, we advocate this practice also
for international data sets. Earlier studies that have examined risk sharing in
international data have typically deflated the data with national (i.e. country-
specific) CPIs. In this way, only fluctuations in the relative quantities but not
in the relative value of consumption are preserved.
What may at first sight appear as a measurement issue is, in fact, an
important conceptual difference: in addition to quantity (i.e.: capital income
and credit) flows, fluctuations in relative consumer prices may constitute a
separate channel of risk sharing. I add such a price channel to the popular
variance decomposition by Asdrubali et al. (1996). Whereas earlier versions
1Some prominent papers are Asdrubali et al. (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Hess and Shin
(1998), Crucini (1999) and Mélitz and Zumer (1999).
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of this decomposition2 have focused on the relative importance of capital
income and credit flows for risk sharing, the version suggested here also
allows to gauge the contribution of price fluctuations. In the framework of this
decomposition, it is straightforward to give economic meaning to the different
practices of deflating regional and international data: the procedure commonly
used on international data simply eliminates fluctuations in relative purchasing
power and therefore does not pick up their contribution to risk sharing. Since
fluctuations in relative prices are particularly important at the international
level where goods markets are relatively segmented, one may expect that
the omission of this channel may have a particularly pronounced effect on
estimates of risk sharing obtained from international data sets.
We find this conjecture confirmed in our empirical investigation, for which
we use data from the Penn World tables for 22 industrialized countries from
1973–2000. Our results show that once the price channel is accounted for in
a comparable way, the coefficients estimated from risk sharing regressions are
similar in regional and international data sets. Hence, conceptual differences in
the preparation of the data used in estimation seem to explain why most studies
find very little risk sharing in international data and a lot in regional data.
Does this finding suggest that there is no lack of international risk sharing?
To explore the anatomy of this result further, we compare our international
results to evidence obtained from regional data sets from Australia, Canada,
Germany and Italy—countries for which consumer price data can be obtained
at a regional level. We find that regions within countries achieve most of their
risk sharing through quantity (income and credit flows), very much as the
earlier literature has documented. Also, quantity flows between countries are
small, again in line with virtually all of the extant literature. In this sense there
is a clear lack of international consumption risk sharing. The reason why we
still find a small coefficient when our version of the risk sharing regression
is performed on international data, is that international inflation differentials
covary strongly with the relative value of a country’s output. This channel, on
the other hand, is virtually absent in regional data, presumably because the
cross-regional dispersion of consumer prices is low.
We interpret the degree of international variation in consumer price infla-
tion as an indication of goods market segmentation or, loosely speaking, of
trading costs. This allows us to read the lack of international quantity—i.e.
income and credit—flows in the light of a recent literature that emphasizes
the role of goods market segmentation in rationalizing some of the major
anomalies in international finance. In particular Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)
have argued that relatively small trading costs in goods markets can lead to
huge equity portfolio home biases and may therefore also explain the apparent
lack of capital flows between countries. In the Obstfeld–Rogoff model this
occurs even though financial markets are complete. While our results do not
imply that either regional or international financial markets are complete, they
2See e.g. Becker and Hoffmann (2006), who examine the contribution of capital income and credit
flows to risk sharing at different horizons.
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provide further empirical support for the view that goods market frictions
rather than financial market frictions can explain the lack of risk sharing at the
country relative to the regional level: As emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000), optimal risk sharing under goods market segmentation implies that in
response to idiosyncratic output shocks, consumption growth is equated across
countries only to the extent that consumption price levels are equated. Ceteris
paribus, larger international price dispersion means that smaller income and
credit flows are required to implement an allocation in which risk is shared
optimally.3 The comparison between our results obtained from international
data on the one hand and regional data on the other suggest that larger
variation in relative prices—as measured by international or interregional in-
flation differentials—does indeed go in hand with smaller cross-border income
and credit flows. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) emphasize that countries’
international asset portfolio weights are highly correlated with their trade
weights. The results here may help explain this finding: if international trade
eliminates country-specific variation in consumer prices, then larger capital
flows may be required to share risk optimally.
Starting with Backus and Smith (1993), a number of studies have empha-
sized that optimal risk sharing implies a high inverse relation between real
exchange rates and relative consumption if purchasing power parity is violated.
The tenor of these studies is that the link between real exchange rates and
consumption growth is tenuous at best. It would therefore seem surprising that
our approach reveals such an important role for relative prices in international
risk sharing. However, our results are perfectly in line with the observation that
real exchange rates and relative consumption are weakly correlated and indeed
we corroborate this finding in our data set. As we argue, correlations between
consumption and real exchange rates may be low for a variety of reasons that
could be unrelated to market incompleteness.4
This is why in this paper we prefer to build on the literature on risk sharing
regressions in the spirit of Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Townsend (1994),
Asdrubali et al. (1996), Crucini (1999) and others. Rather than to examine
correlations between real exchange rates and consumption, we argue, that a
somewhat more robust, reading of the conditions for optimal risk sharing is
that the relative value of marginal utility should not be systematically related
to a country’s idiosyncratic risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we take
stock of the current practice of formulating risk sharing regressions in regional
and international data. We then propose how to adapt the international risk
3We have nothing to say about welfare implications. Clearly, it will be welfare enhancing if there
are no transport costs and if prices equalize, even though this may entail more flows of capital (and
ultimately shipment of goods). Our interest here is in the optimality (or otherwise) of risk sharing
given the structure of goods markets, not in assessing the welfare implications of the respective
structure.
4Indeed, we find that the correlation between consumption and real exchange rates (i.e. inflation
differentials) is very low even in regional data, even though there is wide agreement in the
literature that there is quite a lot of risk sharing at the regional level.
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sharing regression so that it can be compared to the findings from regional data
and we highlight the role of international price dynamics for this adaptation.
In Section 3, we modify the variance decomposition of Asdrubali et al. (1996)
to take account of both a price channel and a quantity channel of international
risk sharing. In Section 4, we present our data set along with our empirical
results. Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2 Risk sharing regressions
The focus of this paper is on panel regressions of the form
 log
[
C˜kt
C˜∗t
]
= β˜u log
[
Y˜kt
Y˜∗t
]
+ εkt (1)
where C˜ and Y˜ are measures of real per capita consumption and output,
respectively, k is the country or region index and the asterisk denotes the
population-weighted rest of the world or country average.
Regressions such as Eq. 1 were first suggested by Mace (1991) and Cochrane
(1991) as tests of financial market completeness: in complete financial markets,
idiosyncratic consumption growth should be independent of idiosyncratic
risk and therefore, in particular of idiosyncratic fluctuations in a country’s
or region’s output. While this intuition is exactly true only under special
assumptions (such as power utility and additive separability in consumption
and leisure), it has proven sufficiently powerful to spark a large and influential
literature that has generated important insights into the structure of inter-
national and interregional risk sharing. In particular, Asdrubali et al. (1996),
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and others have argued very convincingly that the
coefficient β˜u—typically between zero and one in the data—is a measure of
the deviation from the complete markets outcome; it indicates how much of
the idiosyncratic risk represented by fluctuations in  log
[
Ykt
Y∗t
]
is not shared
but spills over into fluctuations in relative consumption.
In international data, estimates of β˜u are generally much higher than in
regional data. This stylized fact documents a lack of international risk sharing.
The fact that β˜u is significantly bigger than zero and often close to unity
amounts to a restatement of the famous international consumption correlation
puzzle first identified by Backus et al. (1992). But the correlation-based
formulation of the puzzle also encounters the so-called quantity anomaly:
international consumption correlations are lower than the correlations in
the underlying risks, i.e. in output growth rates. This would suggest that
countries actually use financial markets to de-stabilize consumption, a very
implausible proposition. Even under complete markets, countries or regions
may experience idiosyncratic demand or preference shocks (see e.g. Stockman
and Tesar 1995) and consumption is often measured with error. In these
cases, consumption growth may be imperfectly correlated across regions but
in complete markets it should still be uncorrelated with idiosyncratic country
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risk characteristics, notably relative output. Presumably for these reasons,
regressions such as Eq. 1 provide a standard metric of risk sharing used in
many empirical studies.
2.1 Common vs. country-specific consumption deflators
As I am going to argue in this sub-section, the coefficients obtained from
studies based on international data are not generally directly comparable
to those based on regional data because the real consumption and output
measures C˜ and Y˜ used in both types of studies are conceptually different.
For most countries, notably the U.S., for which we have the most evidence
in relation to interregional risk sharing, consumer prices are not available at
the regional (say, federal state) level. For this reason, most researchers use the
country-wide CPI to deflate both GDP and consumption.5 Hence, the regional
consumption and output measures are
C˜kt = Ckt CPIkt /CPI∗t and Y˜kt = Pkt Ykt /CPI∗t
where Ckt is the actual quantity of consumption in region k, CPI denotes the
consumer price index and Pk is the regional output deflator.
The risk sharing regression is formulated in terms of relative growth rates,
so that with C˜∗t = C∗t and Y˜∗t = P∗t Y∗t /CPI∗t the risk sharing regression (1)
effectively becomes
 log
[
CPIkt C
k
t
CPI∗t C∗t
]
= βregu  log
[
Pkt Y
k
t
P∗t Y∗t
]
+ εregkt (2)
Hence, in regional data, the risk sharing regression effectively amounts to
running regressions of region-specific nominal consumption growth on the
relative nominal growth rates of output.
Conversely, most studies based on international data deflate both consump-
tion and output with the country-specific CPI, so that C˜kt = Ckt and Y˜kt =
Pkt Y
k
t /CPI
k
t so that the regression run on international data is
 log
[
Ckt
C∗t
]
= β intu  log
[
Pkt Y
k
t /CPI
k
t
P∗t Y∗t /CPI∗t
]
+ εintkt (3)
Clearly, these are not the same regressions. I wish to explore to what
extent the difference in the setup of these regressions affects the comparison
between international and regional measures of risk sharing. Using data from
a number of countries for which regional CPIs are available, I therefore run
the international regression (3) on regional data. Conversely, I will run the
regional regression (2) on an international data set.
This exercise is interesting, because the difference between the two regres-
sions is conceptually important: βreg tells us how the value of consumption
5E.g. Asdrubali et al. (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Crucini (1999) and Mélitz and Zumer
(1999), Becker and Hoffmann (2006). And presumably, this list is far from complete.
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growth relative to the rest of the country reacts to shocks in the value of
regional output. β intu tells us how relative consumption quantities react to
shocks in the quantity of consumption a country can buy for its output.6 The
difference between β int and βregu must tell us something about the role of
interregional and international price dispersion for risk sharing.
As I will show, running the international regression on regional data does
not make much of a difference for our estimate of β˜u: in regional data,
fluctuations in relative consumer prices are relatively small so that the re-
gression outcome is not strongly affected. There is, however, a huge cross-
sectional dispersion in consumer price inflation across countries. I interpret
this dispersion as an indication of goods market segmentation or, loosely
speaking, of trading costs. And, as I will show, fluctuations in relative consumer
prices correlate negatively with relative national output quantities. Therefore,
if regression (2) is run on international data, I find a coefficient that is almost as
low as if it is run on regional data. To the extent that international dispersion
in inflation rates has something to say about the integration of goods markets
this suggests that trading costs may help explain why so little risk sharing is
generally found in international data.
In adapting Eq. 2 to international data, we face the problem of also making
national output measures comparable across countries. In regional data, a
common set of sectoral price indexes is used to construct the regional output
deflator Pk. For example, this is the procedure followed by the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis.7 Hence, the price used to value e.g. oil production is
the same across all U.S. states. Since oil accounts for a much larger share
of output in some U.S. states, such as e.g. Alaska and Texas, fluctuations
in the price of oil will still lead to idiosyncratic fluctuations in the value of
these states’ outputs. Therefore, fluctuations in Pk/P∗ by construction cannot
reflect deviations from the law of one price but only differences in the sectoral
composition of output.
In adapting the regional risk sharing regression to international data, we
therefore use a common set of international prices to compare the value of
output across countries. At the international level, such a set of prices for
the components of GDP is implicit in the data compiled in the Penn World
Tables (PWT). The scope of the PWT is exactly to facilitate such international
comparisons of national account data like the one we are conducting here. To
this end, the PWT uses a common set of dollar prices to value the components
of a country’s output basket. This approach is akin to the construction of GDP
price indexes at the state level. Hence, the risk sharing regression we estimate
in international data has the form
 log
[
CPIkt
CPI∗t
]
+  log
[
Ckt
C∗t
]
= βu
[
 log
[
P$
P∗$
]
+  log
[
Ykt
Y∗t
]]
+ εkt (4)
6The term Pkt /CPI
k
t , the internal terms of trade, gives the value of a country’s output in terms of
its consumption bundle.
7See their windows help file at http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/gsp/OnlineHelp.chm
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where P$/P∗$ denotes the (relative) price level of GDP, in international (i.e.
PPP) prices. We note again that even though home and foreign GDP are
evaluated with the same set of prices, the aggregate GDP price levels do not
have to equalize since domestic and rest-of-the-world GDP will generally be
composed of very different outputs. It is therefore straightforward to interpret
P$/P∗$ as a (PPP adjusted) measure of the terms of trade.
We note here that all of the above specifications abstract from the role of
nominal exchange rate fluctuations. The main reason to do so is that all of the
regression-based literature on international risk sharing has conditioned on
fixed nominal exchange rates. Since our aim here is to understand the anatomy
of the results that earlier studies have obtained from regional and international
data, it is natural that we keep with the approach chosen in these studies.8
Furthermore, it is well known that exchange rates appear largely disconnected
from any plausible macroeconomic fundamentals and this disconnect is also
likely to blur the consumption-real exchange rate relation highlighted by
Backus and Smith (1993). Therefore, to explore the role of nominal exchange
rates in risk sharing, one may need a complete model of currency pricing
which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, nominal exchange
rate movements can only matter in international data. So in comparing results
from risk sharing regressions in regional and international data, we feel it is
instructive to start by abstracting from nominal exchange rate risk.
Before moving on to the next section, we introduce some notational simpli-
fication: all risk sharing regressions are formulated in idiosyncratic terms, i.e.
in relation to a ’rest of the world’ aggregate. This just reflects the fact that only
idiosyncratic risk can be insured. We will therefore abbreviate the logarithm
of relative levels with the lower case letter, so that y = log YkY∗ , c = log C
k
C∗ . It
will also prove convenient to abbreviate with gdp the logarithm of the relative
value of output, i.e. gdp = log P$YkP∗$Y∗ .
3 Prices vs. quantities: channels of risk sharing
In a sequence of seminal papers, Asdrubali et al. (1996)9 and Sørensen
and Yosha (1998) also suggested a variance decomposition of relative GDP
growth that allows to examine, to which extent capital income and credit flows
contribute to consumption risk sharing. They find that at an international level,
capital income flows virtually do not contribute at all to consumption insurance
whereas borrowing and lending ex-post smooths about one quarter of the
variability induced by idiosyncratic output growth. Their setup does, however,
8In virtually all studies, the nominal exchange rate is kept fixed by transferring quantities in a base
year into a common currency denomination using base year nominal exchange rates. Clearly, since
all regressions are in first differences, the choice of this exchange rate is of no practical relevance.
9For convenience, we will often refer to this paper as ‘ASY.’
The lack of international consumption risk sharing 191
not explicitly consider relative price adjustment as a mechanism of risk sharing.
We now propose a version of the ASY-decomposition that allows to examine
to what extent relative consumer price variability affects international risk
sharing.
To this end, we write
P$Y = YINC ×
INC
C
× P$
CPI
× CPI × C
where the new symbol INC denotes national income and will usually be
measured by GNP. We take logarithms and apply the variance operator on
both sides. Using the notational convention introduced at the end of the last
section, we can write
var(gdp) = cov(y − inc,gdp)
+ cov(inc − c,gdp)
+ cov(p$ − cpi,gdp)
+ cov(cpi + c,gdp)
Dividing through by var(gdp) we get
1 = βinc + βcons + βprice + βu
where
βinc = cov(y − inc,gdp)
var(gdp)
βcons = cov(inc − c,gdp)
var(gdp)
βprice = cov(p$ − cpi,gdp)
var(gdp)
βu = cov(cpi + c,gdp)
var(gdp)
Since the wedge between output and income reflects cross-border flows
of (capital or dividend) income, βinc measures risk sharing through cap-
ital (i.e. equity) markets. In the same mould, βc measures consumption
smoothing through saving or dissaving in credit markets whereas βu reflects
the unsmoothed component of risk. The interpretation of the coefficients
βinc, βcons and also βu is therefore quite analogus to that suggested by
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ASY (1996) in their version of the variance decomposition of output.10 We
refer to the sum of βinc and βcons as the quantity channel since it measures how
quantity flows in the form of credit or income streams help stabilize relative
consumption. We abbreviate the contribution of the quantity channel with
βq = cov(y − c,gdp)/var(gdp).
The new channel we introduce is the price channel and its contribution is
given by βprice. This coefficient measures to what extent international goods
market segmentation and hence the possibility of consumer prices to differ
across regions can make quantity flows unnecessary for the optimal allocation
of risk. The main mechanism we mean to capture with βprice is prominently
highlighted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000): if consumer prices fall in response
to a positive output shock, consumers will take advantage of low prices to
increase their consumption. This will induce a negative comovement between
(relative) consumption and (relative) output. The quantity-based risk sharing
regression will register this comovement as a failure of financial markets to
provide consumption insurance, even though it may just reflect an optimal
response to idiosyncratic price fluctuations.
4 Empirical implementation
4.1 Results from international data
The source of our international data are the Penn World Tables of which we
use release 6.1. (PWT 6.1.). Besides data from national accounts, the PWT also
contain a set of deflators that have been constructed using a set of common
international prices. This allows us to obtain an internationally comparable
measure of the value of a country’s output, i.e. gdp = p$ + y.
The PWT expresses all data in per capita terms. We generate the Rest-of-
the-world (RoW) aggregate as the population-weighted mean. We construct
measures of world-wide (RoW) GDP components using population weighted
averages, where the population data is also from the PWT. Our analysis covers
a panel of 22 industrialized countries over the period 1973–2000. Virtually all
of the countries in the panel are OECD members and we sometimes refer to
them under this label. Specifically, the countries in our cross-section are:
1. Canada, 2. the United States, 3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium,
6. Denmark, 7. Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece,
11. Ireland, 12. Italy, 13. Luxemburg, 14. Netherlands, 15. Norway,
16. Portugal, 17. Spain, 18. Sweden, 19. Switzerland, 20. United Kingdom,
21. Australia, 22. New Zealand.
10We note, however, that they are not analytically the same: in ASY and Sørensen and Yosha
(1998), the variable with respect to which income and consumption are smoothed is  log Y, in our
setup it is  log
[
P$Y
]
. We empirically explore the importance of this difference in Section 4.4.
The lack of international consumption risk sharing 193
Table 1 Price adjusted and quantity based risk sharing regressions
Price adjusted Quantity based
Coefficient estimate 0.20 (2.48) 0.68 (8.37)
The price adjusted regression is cpi + c = βu gdp + u the quantity-based regression is
c = βuy + v. Panel OLS estimates with country and time-specific fixed effects. Robust t−
statistics based on Newey and West (1987) in parentheses
We start our empirical analysis by estimating our adapted version of the
regional risk sharing regression (4) on international data. We then compare
the outcomes to that obtained from the standard international risk sharing
regression (3).11 We take account of country specific fixed effects by removing
the mean from each country-time series. By expressing all variables in growth
rates relative to the rest of the world, we also account for time-specific fixed
effects. We then estimate the risk sharing regressions by means of panel OLS.
Throughout the paper, we report heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
based on Newey and West (1987).
In Table 1, the price-adjusted version of the risk sharing regression reveals
a lot more risk sharing than the purely quantity based specification: the
coefficient on the price adjusted equation is 0.20, whereas the coefficient of
quantity-based regression is 0.68. The latter is completely in line with what
is typically found in risk sharing regressions based on international data and
suggests that only about a quarter to a third of all idiosyncratic country risk is
smoothed or insured (e.g. Sørensen and Yosha 1998; Crucini 1999).
The price-adjusted risk sharing regression, on the other hand, reveals that
taking account of differences in consumer prices and correcting for different
price levels of GDP matters substantially for the amount of risk that is found
to be shared. Our estimate of 0.20 is rather in the order of magnitude of the
coefficient estimated from risk sharing regressions based on US state-level data
(Asdrubali et al. 1996; Crucini 1999; Mélitz and Zumer 1999).
In the following subsections we first attempt to identify what the channels
of risk sharing are in the price adjusted setup and what the sources of
this dramatic drop in the international risk sharing coefficient are. We then
compare these findings to an implementation of the international, quantity-
based regression (3) on regional data.
4.2 Prices vs. quantities?
Through which channels is the allocation of risk achieved once we take account
of both relative price fluctuations and quantity flows? The variant of the ASY
11We will also refer to this regression as the quantity-based regression since it does not take
account of relative consumer price variability. Furthermore, since for most countries the national
GDP price deflator is highly correlated with CPI, regression (3) also the regressor reflects what
are virtually pure quantities.
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Table 2 Channels of risk sharing
Channel Coefficient estimate
Price adjusted Quantity based
Quantity βinc 0.05 (1.52) 0.04 (1.19)
βcons 0.27 (4.73) 0.29 (3.94)
Price βprice 0.48 (7.89) –
The price adjusted regressions are regressions of y − inc (βinc),inc − c (βcons) and
p$ − cpi (βprice)on gdp. The quantity adjusted regressions are the same variables (except
p$ − cpi)regressed on y. On estimation details see Table 1
decomposition that we suggested in the previous section can shed light on
this issue. In Table 2 we report the estimates of the β-coefficients. Half of
all idiosyncratic risk is buffered by relative movements in the terms of trade
and real exchange rates, our point estimate of βprice is 0.48. The two quantity-
flow channels taken together account for only 30%. This suggests that relative
dynamics in the internal terms of trade can account for most of the allocation
of idiosyncratic risk, much more than do international capital flows.
For comparison, we also estimate a purely quantity-based decomposition
of relative GDP growth, i.e. a version of the risk sharing regression where
y − inc and inc − c are regressed on y instead of gdp. This is the
regressions that is typically run on international data, when the data are
deflated with the country-specific CPI. The second column of Table 2 reports
the outcome of this exercise. Even though the regressor is quite different in
the price-adjusted regressions, the point estimates for the βs associated with
income and consumption smoothing respectively, are very similar in both the
price adjusted and the pure quantity-based decompositions.
Hence, accounting for deviations from PPP and for terms of trade fluctua-
tions does not alter our conclusions as to what extent international quantity
flows contribute to international risk sharing. But it does provide a way to
understand why international risk sharing generally appears so low: consumer
and output prices covary systematically with idiosyncratic risk in OECD
countries. This effect goes a long way towards explaining why most studies
would find more risk sharing in regional than in international data.
4.3 International vs. regional evidence from risk sharing regressions
We now study the relative importance of price and quantity dynamics for
risk sharing by looking at regional data from a small group of countries, for
which both real and nominal consumption and GDP data are available at the
regional level. The countries and the sample of years for which we have data
are: Australia (1990–2002), Canada (1980–2000), Italy (1960–96) and Germany
(1996–2002). We provide details on the regional data in the Appendix.
Only for Canada and Germany we have income measures at the regional
level. Since the scope of our analysis is not to assess the relative importance
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Table 3 Relative role of price and quantity channels in regional data
Country Quantity flows Price Unsmoothed
βq βprice βu
Australia 0.43 (4.93) 0.50 (5.34) 0.70 (0.78)
Canada 0.64 (5.80) 0.16 (2.02) 0.18 (2.93)
Germany 0.58 (6.14) 0.01 (0.19) 0.42 (3.55)
Italy 0.77 (16.83) 0.07 (3.67) 0.11 (4.86)
See Table 1
of the two quantity channels we just identify the sum of βinc + βc = βq by
regressing y − c on gdp. Table 3 provides the estimates of βq and βprice
as well as of the unsmoothed part, βu, for the four countries.
In as far as the size of the unsmoothed component βu is concerned, our
estimates provide a wholesale confirmation of those obtained by ASY and
others for U.S. data: roundabout three quarters of all idiosyncratic risk is
shared among the regions of a country. While small relative to the standard
international quantity regression, the non-insured component is generally
significant.
As becomes apparent, the price channel contributes a lot less to risk sharing
than it does in international data. This may not appear too surprising since
persistent difference in particular in consumer price inflation are a feature
rather of international than of regional data. But it is noteworthy that the price
effect, though small, is significant in all countries except Germany.12
These results confirm our previous conjecture: controlling for relative price
effects in international data reveals a much smaller deviation from the com-
plete markets outcome than is commonly found using what we call a quantity
based regression. Eventually, the allocation of risk is comparably efficient to
that in regional data. What is different are the channels of risk sharing at the
regional and the international levels.
Our interpretation of these findings is that goods markets are more inte-
grated among the regions of a country than among countries and therefore
consumer price differentials are small. Equating the value of marginal utilities
across regions therefore virtually amounts to equating real marginal utilities
which in turn requires big quantity flows. On the other hand, optimal risk
sharing contracts between countries will take account of the fact that goods
markets are very segmented internationally. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)
provide evidence that countries that trade a lot with each other also have
12For Australia, the data reveal relative roles of quantity and price channels that are comparable
to what we have obtained from international data. While this is an interesting result, we note two
things: first, our sample for Australia is rather short. Second, to obtain measure of the regional
GDP deflator, we had to use an experimental volume chain index for real state-level GDP. The
Australian Bureau of Statistics issues a note of caution regarding the use of this series. We would
therefore not overemphasize this particular result.
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larger cross-holdings of financial assets. One reason for this may be that
trade eliminates price differentials and therefore, consumption insurance can
ultimately only be achieved through a diversified portfolio of financial assets.13
Interestingly, some authors have also documented a quantity anomaly—
a high comovement between relative consumption and output—in regional
data. Hess and Shin (1998) find that regressions for US state-level income
and consumption yield coefficients near unity, not unlike the quantity-based
risk sharing regressions obtained from international data. Del Negro (2002)
confirms the results obtained by Hess and Shin and claims that the high
levels of risk sharing identified by Asdrubali et al. (1996) can be explained
by measurement error in the ASY data set.
Again, it seems that the principal difference between those studies that
find a quantity anomaly and those that find high levels of risk sharing in
regional data lies in the way they deflate the data. Asdrubali et al. (1996) and
Crucini (1999) deflate gross state product (the state level equivalent of GDP)
with the consumption price index whereas Hess and Shin deflate GSP with
the respective state GSP-deflator. Sørensen and Yosha (2007) argue that the
right way to deflate quantities in risk sharing regressions is with the CPI: the
endowment risk of an economy is the value of its GDP in terms of the country’s
consumption basket. This implies that nominal output should be deflated with
the CPI. The present paper has extended this logic in two important respects:
first, we have argued that the data should be deflated with the area-wide
(’common’) CPI so that fluctuations in relative consumption price levels are
preserved. Secondly, in international data it may also be important to use
international prices to price output. We turn to a further discussion of this
second point in the next subsection.
4.4 The role of international prices
In order to adapt the regional risk sharing regression, we have used a common
set of international GDP deflators. The primary reason for doing so was
that this is also the practice how GDP is valued in regional data. There is
also a theoretical justification for following this approach: the maintained
13To the extent that trade eventually eliminates price differentials, we should expect the role of the
price channel in international data to decline in the long-run, quite in line with a growing literature
that suggests that purchasing power parity may ultimately hold. Following Becker and Hoffmann
(2006), I therefore examined the role of relative price variability at long horizons by performing the
variance decomposition suggested above in the levels of the variables instead of first differences.
As discussed in this earlier paper, this regression constitutes a long-run panel relation in the
sense of Phillips and Moon (1999). Hence, even though the individual time series may be non-
stationary and may not necessarily be integrated, there is no risk of spurious regression. The
results of this exercise provide strong support for the interpretation above: in the long-run relative
price fluctuations play a much smaller role for risk sharing. In international data, I now estimate
βprice = 0.05. Though still significant, (t-statistics: 2.37) this is much smaller than the corresponding
βprice estimated from first differences in Table 2. Conversely, quantity flows keep up quite well in
the levels specification and the ex ante channel even gains in importance. (βinc = 0.10 (tstat = 2.54)
and βcons = 0.23 (tstat = 4.59)). I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this exercise.
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Table 4 Role of international GDP price deflators
Channel Coefficient estimate
Quantity βinc 0.04 (1.20)
βcons 0.29 (3.94)
Price βprice 0.32 (4.20)
Regressions of y − inc (βinc), inc − c (βcons) and −cpi (βprice)on y . On estimation
details see Table 1
hypothesis in all of the risk sharing literature running regressions such as Eq. 1
is that international flows can, in principle, generate an allocation in which
consumption can be made completely independent of output. This implies that
output is perfectly tradeable. But in making this assumption, we should also
impose a common set of prices to value this output rather than national GDP
price deflators. On the other hand, consumption in country k has to take place
in country k, so that the price level that is relevant for consumers in country k
is not an international price but a local currency-price.14
One issue that may arise in this context is that the PWT’s set of international
GDP prices could be subject to measurement error, plausibly on a larger
scale than are regional output price levels. This could lead to attenuation
bias since relative growth in the value of GDP is the regressor in all our
regressions. Secondly, it may be interesting to explore to what extent the choice
of GDP deflator contributes to the price channel: is it relative consumer price
variability or are our findings induced by fluctuations in p$?
We address these issues jointly by running all regressions of the extended
ASY decomposition above with real rather than nominal relative GDP growth
as regressor, i.e. we take out any effect that derives from valuing output at
international prices by using y instead of gdp = p$ + y.15 Comparing
the results, given in Table 4, to the price adjusted regressions in Table 2 shows
that this has virtually no effect on the coefficients of the quantity channels,
a strong indication that measurement error cannot be a problem since it
should lead to attenuation bias in both the regressions for the quantity and
the price channels. The coefficient on the price channel decreases somewhat.
The obvious interpretation is that in the price regression in Table 2, the
term cov(p$ − cpi,p$) is positive; fluctuations in cpi not only shield
consumption from fluctuations in output quantities but also from ups and
downs in the international terms of trade, p$. This again suggests that our
results reported above are largely driven by international variation in inflation
differentials and only to a very limited extent by the choice of output price
deflator.
14At a theoretical level, our approach could be justified by a model in which output consists of
intermediate inputs that are highly tradeable internationally. These outputs can then either be
traded or be transformed into an imperfectly tradeable consumption good.
15I thank George von Fuerstenberg for suggesting this course of analysis.
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4.5 The relation between real exchange rates and consumption
I conclude my analysis by relating my results to another strand of the literature
that—starting with Backus and Smith (1993)—has emphasized that optimal
risk sharing implies a high correlation between real exchange rates and con-
sumption if consumer prices do not equalize across countries. This literature
has found it difficult to document any robust link between these two variables.
As we have argued earlier in the context of the quantity puzzle, international
consumption correlations may be low for reasons that are unrelated to market
incompleteness. The same reasons could explain why the correlation between
consumption and real exchange rates—and in regional data between inflation
differentials and consumption—is so low.16 In international data, the problem
of finding a meaningful correlation between exchange rates and consumption
is likely to be compounded by the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. I illustrate
these issues in Table 5: even in what we would believe is a financially well-
integrated area—the regions of a country—and even after the elimination
of nominal exchange rate variability, the link between relative inflation and
consumption is weak.
The table reports the results of regressions of inflation differentials and real
exchange rate changes on real idiosyncratic consumption growth, both for the
international but also for the four regional data sets described above. In inter-
national data, the coefficient estimate for the inflation differential regression
is −0.20, whereas the coefficient for the real exchange rate regression is 0.16.
Whereas the first coefficient is highly significant, the second is not. The average
Table 5 Inflation differentials, real exchange rate changes and relative consumption
Regression on c Average correlation with c
coeff. t-stat R2
Intl’ Data cpi −0.20 (−2.84) 0.04 −0.19
cpi − e 0.16 (1.14) 0.004 0.04
Australia cpi −0.05 (−2.11) 0.04 −0.19
Canada cpi −0.03 (−2.41) 0.02 −0.14
Germany cpi −0.05 (−1.15) 0.03 −0.18
Italy cpi −0.142 (−3.07) 0.04 −0.23
Notes: The average correlation is 1K
∑K
k=1 corr(ck,pk) where k is the number of regions or
countries. For notes on regression results see again Table 1
16Indeed, market incompleteness alone may not even be sufficient to rationalize the correlations
between consumption and real exchange rates that is typically found in the data. Baxter and
Crucini (1995) have demonstrated that the equilibria in complete market economies are almost
identical to those of a bonds-only economy, unless shocks get very persistent. As argued by
Corsetti et al. (2004), it may therefore be rather difficult to generate realistic correlations between
real exchange rates and consumption through market incompleteness alone.
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(across countries) correlation of relative consumption growth and inflation
differentials is −0.19, the average correlation between real exchange rates
and consumption virtually zero. Regressing inflation differentials on relative
consumption growth in regional data, we obtain on average coefficients that
are even lower (in absolute value) than in international data. The average
correlation ranges from −0.14 to -0.23. The R2 statistics are low in all
regressions.
Hence, there is virtually no relation between real exchange rates and
consumption at the international level, quite in keeping with results in Backus
and Smith (1993) and elsewhere. But the results from regional data show that
even the elimination of nominal exchange rate variability in financially well
integrated areas does not help to establish a particularly pronounced link
between the two variables. In fact, once we abstract from nominal exchange
rate variability in international data, the link between inflation differentials
and consumption is no stronger in regional than in international data. These
findings seem to suggest that the Backus–Smith condition gives us an important
theoretical puzzle to solve, but it also seems to teach us that the consumption-
real exchange rate correlation may have relatively little to say about the extent
of risk sharing.
5 Discussion and conclusion
A lot more risk is shared among the regions within a country than among coun-
tries. This is the evidence from a well-established literature that has looked at
risk sharing regressions, i.e. regressions of idiosyncratic consumption growth
on idiosyncratic output growth. This paper has argued that the way in which
the data have been deflated in risk sharing regressions when applied to inter-
national data is conceptually different from the way in which regional data are
deflated in such cases: whereas international data are deflated with country-
specific CPIs, regional data have mostly been deflated with the country-wide
(i.e. a common) CPI. The latter approach leaves relative price movements
intact, whereas the former eliminates them. But relative price movements are
important from a risk sharing perspective and they may be particularly so
between countries, where consumer price movements are known to be much
more idiosyncratic than among the relatively well-integrated regions within a
country.
Our results suggest that accounting for this price channel can indeed explain
why there is an apparent lack of risk sharing between countries. It seems
that consumption allocations observed between countries are not as far away
from an optimal allocation (of risk) as is often thought. Movements in the
relative price levels of consumption and output account for a lot of the
departure from the full risk sharing allocation at the international level. Still,
our results corroborate the findings by Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Crucini
(1999), Becker and Hoffmann (2006) and others that quantity (income and
credit) flows between countries are small relative to quantity flows between
regions. Certainly, in this respect there is a lack of international risk sharing.
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But our interpretation of these findings is that goods markets—rather than
financial markets—are a lot more segmented between countries than between
regions. The more segmented goods markets are , the higher the dispersion
of prices across regions or countries will generally be. And the more the
price of consumption can differ across countries, the less quantity flows
are needed to optimally share risk: if it is costly to ship goods, then other
things equal, optimal financial contracts will minimize the shipment of capital
(and therefore ultimately: goods) between countries. If prices do not equalize
between countries or regions, then consumption should be relatively high when
prices are relatively low.
These findings are consistent with a recent strand of the theoretical lit-
erature that emphasizes that frictions in international goods markets may
be the main ‘culprits’ behind the major quantity anomalies in international
macroeconomics (see notably Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)). They can also
help understand the empirical regularity—recently highlighted by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2004)—that countries’ international asset portfolio weights are
highly correlated with their trade weights: among countries that have highly
integrated goods markets and therefore quite similar consumption prices,
capital income and credit flows will be needed to achieve an efficient allocation
of consumption risk. Therefore, one may expect these countries to have more
substantial cross-holdings of financial assets than pairs of countries for which
relative price dynamics plays an important role in allocating idiosyncratic risk.
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Appendix
Regional data sources
Australia: All data are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and are
available at the state level. The CPI data are the CPIs of the respective eight
capital cities. Consumption and output are obtained from the breakdown of
state level GDP by expenditure and are mid-year estimates (June), ranging
from 1990–2002. Income is real gross state domestic income, 1992–2002.
Canada: The data are from Statistics Canada. The data series are personal
income, retail sales, population, GDP and CPI by province and range from
1981–2002.
Germany: All data are from the Statistisches Bundesamt, at the federal state
level for all 16 federal states. The data range is 1990–2002.
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Italy: We used the REGIO-IT data set from the Centro di Ricerche Eco-
nomiche Nord Sud (CRENoS) at University of Cagliari. The data range from
1960–1996.
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